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INTRODUCTION

How could anyone have known that the arrival of the internet age
would have such a devastating effect on the trial process?' Today, there
is no such thing as a speedy trial. The internet has brought along ediscovery and courts now have to navigate "e-battles." 2 Further, with
*
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her during the writing of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Rebecca Porter, Texts and Tweets by Jurors, Lawyers Pose Courtroom
Conundrums, 45 TRIAL 12 (2009) (noting the problems jury rooms face in light of technology
use in the courtroom); Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googlingfor the Perfect Juror,REUTERS,
Feb. 17, 2011, available at http://us.mobile.reuter.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE71
G4VW20110217 (discussing the use of technology by lawyers seeking to optimize the voir dire
process to ultimately select better jurors).
2. "E-battles" is a term used by the author to describe all issues of electronic origin that
affect the trial process.
265
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the internet at their fingertips, jurors, who are meant to be impartial, are
constantly seeking information about the parties in a lawsuit,3 the law
applicable to the case, 4 or unfamiliar legal definitions of words in the
case that they are deliberating.5 The internet has made the quest for
information easily accessible.6 As a result, jurors want to be informed.
This Article argues that in light of the information age, the natures of
jurors have changed. Now, information is readily accessible, easily
digestible, and heavily relied upon. Modern jurors are equipped with the
internet on many electronic gadgets, and there is no longer a waiting
period to access information; it is all at their fingertips (i.e., Google,
Bing, Yahoo, smart phones and Wikipedia). Jurors seek information
about a defendant, a defective product forming the basis of a lawsuit, or
any other information pertaining to the trial they are asked to decide.
We are seeing more and more jury misconduct due to the use of the
ubiquitous internet, which crops up in the trial process on a regular
basis. What compounds the problem even more is that an increased
number of younger individuals are being selected to serve as jurors.
Consequently, the younger the jury, the more likely a juror will be
technologically proficient and dependent on the technology.8
Formerly, a lawyer's biggest fear was that a juror would fall asleep
and miss important information that could help the jury reach a decision
during deliberations. Another fear that led defendants to challenge jury
verdicts was the belief that the particular composition of the jury offered
greater probability of conviction. 10 Today, the fear is not whether the
3. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Rodriguez v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., No. 101226, 2011 WL 1356669, at *14 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2011) (noting that a juror used the internet to look
up information about the lawyers in the case).
4. See Tapenes v. State, 43 So. 3d 159, 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (discussing a situation
where the foreperson of the jury used his smart phone to search for the definitions of "prudent"
and "prudence").
5. See United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that a
juror looked up information on the internet and shared her findings with other members of the
jury).
6.

See Internet Usage and Populationin North America, INTERNET WORLD STATS (Dec.

16, 2012), http://www.internetworldstats.com/statsl4.htm. In 2012, there were more than 245
million Americans using the internet and 166 million using Facebook. Id. These staggering
numbers indicate that over 78% of people in America have the wherewithal to access the
internet for information and they are doing so. Id
7. See Steven Wallace, The Internet Infects the Courtroom: The Simple Jury Instruction
to not ConsiderAnything Other than the Evidence and the Law may no Longer be Sufficient in a
Technologically Advanced Society, 93 JUDICATURE 138, 138 (2010).
8. Id.
9. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Rodriguez v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., No. 101226, 2011 WL 1356669, at *14 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2011).
10.

JoN M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO

REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 45 (1977).
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juror falls asleep or the racial makeup of the jury." Rather, the main
issue in the modem courtroom is whether the jurors are using the
internet, namely social media, to obtain prejudicial information about
the parties and issues of the lawsuit.12 However, despite the prevalence
of this issue, courts are refusing to acknowledge that the use of the
internet by jurors constitutes outside influence, which is prejudicial to a
party defending a suit.1 3 Even when courts do not grant mistrials, they
still find the existence of juror misconduct directly related to the
internet.14 The problem is growing and there is no end in sight.
In the past, prejudicial juror misconduct did not lead to courts
declaring mistrials. Accordingly, even though times have changed and
the nature of the misconduct has changed, courts will go to
extraordinary lengths to find that social media use by jurors is not
enough to grant a mistrial. 16 One reason for the reluctance to grant
mistrials is that our rules are set up to give finality to jury verdicts.' 7
Judges do not want to go behind juries to query how verdicts were
reached.' 8 Another consideration is that mistrials tax the court system in
money and time. Further, since the use of social media in the courtroom
has exploded, courts in different jurisdictions are deciding social media
cases involving jurors in vastly different ways.19 Once again, the
11. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Rodriguez v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., No. 101226, 2011 WL 1356669, at *14.
12. Id. at 8-10.
13. See United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *61, *64 (E.D. Penn.
June 17, 2009) (finding that a juror did not receive outside influence by posting about the trial
on Facebook and Twitter); Williams v. State, 05-10-00464-CR, 2011 WL 5027495, at *1 (Tex.
App. Oct. 24, 2011) ("[A]n outside influence is something outside ofthe both the jury room and
the juror." (quoting White v. State, 225 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (emphasis
added))).
14. See Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, US. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS, Dec. 8,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-jurors-idUSTRE6B
74Z820101208.
15. See Nancy J. King, JurorDelinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, at
94 MICH. L. REv. 2673, 2712 (1996) ("Longer trials, with their recesses and breaks, allowed
jurors many more opportunities to expose themselves to outside influence, conduct experiments,
visit the scene of the event, share liquor, or otherwise act improperly before the verdict was
returned.").
16. See Goupil v. Cattell, No. 07-cv-58-SM, 2008 WL 544863, at *2, *10 (D.N.H. Feb.
26, 2008) (concluding that comments by a juror on the juror's blog, including, among other
things, about having "to listen to the local riff-raff try and convince me of their innocence," was
not the "type of 'extraneous' or 'extrinsic' trial communication by or with a juror that is
presumptively prejudicial to a criminal defendant").
17. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2009). During
jury deliberations in a criminal defense trial, the foreman wrote a note to the judge informing the
judge that a juror performed internet research on federal laws and definitions of legal terms
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electronic or internet age is affecting the landscape of our court system;
threatening to toss the entire system on its head. This time, the blow hits
hard at one of the most sacred rights, the right to an impartial jury trial.
Part I of this Article discusses the jury process and information
delivery. Part II examines the effect of the explosion of social media
networks on juries. Part III analyzes the law regarding jury misconduct.
Part IV explores ways to ameliorate the inevitable encroachment of
social media and the internet on juries. This Article concludes by
providing recommendations to combat the problem of maintaining an
impartial jury.
I. THE JURY PROCESS AND INFORMATION DELIVERY

The U.S. Constitution, by means of the Sixth Amendment, promises
an accused the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury.20 The Seventh
Amendment provides civil litigants with substantially similar
protections.21 A defendant's right to an impartial trial is a hallmark of
our judicial system,22 with many safeguards to ensure its
accomplishment. Consequently, the onus falls on the judicial system
to ensure that impaneled jurors are impartial.24 In Irvin v. Dowd,5 the
Supreme Court held that where a defendant fails to be provided an
impartial hearing, the ensuing process "violates even the minimal
standards of due process."26 This "minimal standard" permeates issues
pertaining to juries.27 More specifically, one of the safeguards ensuring
pertaining to the case and read her findings aloud to other jurors. Id at 36. When defendants
learned of the research performed by the juror, they moved for a mistrial. Id. at 38. The court
denied the motion and defendants appealed. Id. The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the district court's failure to inquire into the offending juror's conduct so as to ensure the
remaining jurors could be impartial "constituted an abuse of discretion because it compromised
the defendants' right to have a trial by an unbiased jury." Id. at 43-44.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V1l.
22. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 421 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The right of jury
trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal
jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh Amendment." (quoting Jacob v. City of New
York, 315 U.S. 752, 854 (1942))).
23. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) (listing the defendant's rights to
confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel as safeguards for the defendant's right to an
impartial trial).
24.

JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE D. SALES, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION 17 (1st ed.

2007).
25.
26.
27.
impartial

366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961).
Id. at 722.
Id. (stating that because "only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or life[,]" an
jury is necessary to ensure due process).
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that a defendant receives an impartial hearing is that whatever evidence
used by the jury to arrive at its verdict must be only evidence produced
28
and developed during the trial process. Or, as Justice Holmes wrote in
1907, "the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print." 29
Yet, this was not the original import or meaning of having an
impartial jury.30 Impartiality implied that jurors had no personal
affiliation or pecuniary interest in the parties or the outcome of the
matter before the judge. 3 1 Thus, not only did jurors know the parties
involved in the lawsuit, they were expected to make their own
investigations to address any concerns pertaining to the lawsuit. 3 2
However, while defining the original meaning of impartiality is
debatable, 33 there is no debate about the expectations of today's jury
where jurors are to be seen and not heard, having no interaction until the
close of the trial.34 Everything a jury sees or does is closely monitored.3 5
How the jury receives information, as well as what information it
receives, is highly guarded.3 6 Hence, most jurisdictions prohibit any and
28. See Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73 ("[Tjrial by jury in a criminal case necessarily
implies at the very least that the 'evidence developed' against a defendant shall come from the
witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's
right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel."); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 737-38 (1993); United States v. Medlin, 408 F. App'x 203, 204 (10th Cir. 2003).
29. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
217 (1982) (discussing the ramifications of the Sixth Amendment guarantee regarding an
impartial jury as a jury "capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before
it"); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 737-38 (stating that the primary purpose ofjury privacy and
secrecy is to protect from improper prejudicial influence).
30. See Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1674 (2000) (discussing how common law juries consisted of "twelve
representatives of the community that had suffered the crime" as opposed to "simply any twelve
laypersons").
31. Id. ("Jurors were impartial in the sense that they could not be related to either of the
parties or have a financial interest in the trial.").
32. See Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 123,
133-45 (2003) (basing the author's argument of a self-informing jury on investigations of
thirteenth century treatises and court reports).
33. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 46 ("Little attention was given to the specific meaning
of the words 'impartial jury' during the ratification debates, so we cannot say for certain what
they meant then[.]").
34. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 162 (1989) ("Like good
children, good jurors are to be seen and not heard.").
35.

See JEFFREY ABRAMSON,

WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF

DEMOCRACY 5 (1994) (noting that some judges refuse to allow jurors to "take notes during trial
or to have written copies of the legal instructions" the jurors are expected to abide by).
36. Id.
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all conversation between jurors prior to deliberation.3 7
Therefore, modem jury procedure is one where jury information
forming the basis of a verdict is filtered to the jury through the use of
the Rules of Evidence-State and Federal. In other words, the only
information that jurors can base their decisions on is the information
obtained through the trial process of legally admissible evidence
capable of being subject to cross-examination during the trial.39 Yet
before the latter process, jurors get information on the case that has been
vetted by the judge and the lawyers after pre-trial motions in limine,
motions to suppress evidence, or other motions that are raised during
the course of the trial. 40 Effectively, jurors are mostly receiving
"second-hand" information or no information at all about important
aspects of the crime, parties involved in the lawsuit, or other
information that could be useful or potentially useful to jurors'
deliberations. 4 1 Jurors want to know more than what they are getting
from the trial process.4 2 The underpinning reason for keeping
inadmissible information from jurors-by utilizing numerous rules of
evidence 43-is built on the premise that jurors will not understand or
appreciate the evidence and may even be misled by such evidence. 44
Particularly, evidence may even be deemed inadmissible where a judge
determines-among other reasons-that such evidence may lead jurors
to erroneously decide an issue on an emotional basis. 4 5 A corollary of
37. See Jessica L. Bregant, Note, Let's Give Them Something to Talk About: An
EmpiricalEvaluationofPredeliberationDiscussions, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1213, 1215 (2009).
38. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring that judges determine whether the relevant
evidence is prejudicial thereby outweighing the probative value of the evidence).
39. See Hon. Ronald D. Spears, Looking for "Facts" in All the Wrong Places, 98 ILL.
B.J. 102, 102 (2010) ("Rules of evidence and due process require that only legally admissible
evidence be considered after subjection to cross-examination in open court.").
40. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (excluding character evidence used to prove action in
conformity with that action); FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect).
41. Spears, supra note 39 (noting that having to rely solely on the evidence presented at
trial, no matter how deficient the evidence is, can be frustrating to a judge or juror).
42. Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to
DisregardInadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 473 (2006)
(positing that the impetus behind a juror's need to rely on outside evidence is the juror's desire
to impose an honest judgment in a case).
43. See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (prohibiting admissibility of hearsay evidence unless an
exception exists); FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring judges to determine whether the relevant
evidence is prejudicial thereby outweighing the probative value of the evidence).
44. See John H. Langbein, HistoricalFoundationsof the Law of Evidence: A View from
the Ryder Sources, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 1168, 1194-95 (1996); see also Spears, supra note 39
("Information on the Internet has not been subjected to this truth-refining process and therefore
is not generally reliable for court purposes.").
45. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (stating relevant information can be
excluded if such information has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
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this belief can be seen from campaigns for tort reform and the ensuing
legislation to enact tort reform, because proponents argued "that juries
are irrational and arbitrary and that jury awards must be curtailed or
eliminated" altogether.46 Our rules and our system are predicated upon
the belief that it is imperative that jurors are kept in the dark about what
evidence is excluded from trial and why, as such information may also
have adverse consequences on the final verdict. 47
The "asylum approach to jurors" 48 advances the idea that jurors must
be protected from themselves. This approach has also caused
participants in the process to have suspicions about the justice of
verdicts. 49 When juries are treated in this manner, the insinuation is that
a jury does not have the capacity to reach a proper verdict without the
judge shielding and holding its hands ensuring that only evidence the
judge deems it can handle will be admissible. For the modem jury, the
insinuation has caused a further backlash in the internet age of
information and distraction.5 ' This backlash is based on juror distrust of
the system they are a part of, 5 2 which often results in the juror's desire
to find out more information about the case than the juror is receiving
from the trial.53
The internet age also caused a gaping hole with the emergence of
electronic discovery in the trial process. 5 The solution to this problem
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one"); See VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at xi.
46. Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting of Jury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the
Distribution)Wagging the Dog?, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 539, 546 (2006).
47. See Alschuler, supra note 34 (noting that the rules of evidence require judges and
lawyers to use a balancing approach for probative evidence and prejudicial evidence but "jurors
who evaluate similarly fallible evidence in their everyday lives cannot").
48. "Asylum approach to jurors" is a phrase coined by the author to illustrate how our
legal system views jurors as needing to be protected from certain information that may harm or
wrongfully influence their judgment.
49. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 46.
50. See Bruce A. Green, "The Whole Truth?": How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers
Deceitful, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 699, 703 (1992) ("Evidentiary rules [ ] are predicated in large
measure on the law's distrust ofjuries."); see, e.g., Steblay et al., supra note 42 (discussing how
the jury motivation to make accurate judgments may influence the extent to which a jury
complies with jury instructions).
51. Green, supra note 50 (stating that the rules of evidence, even though unintentional,
have fostered the jury's distrust of lawyers).
52. Id (explaining that the use and application of exclusionary rules of evidence by
lawyers provide the incentive for jurors to believe that "lawyers are deliberately withholding
evidence"); see also Steblay et al., supra note 42 ("Jurors can be expected to rely on
inadmissible evidence, despite instruction to the contrary, if it is seen as reliable and probative
from the jurors' perspective.").
53. See Steblay et al., supra note 42.
54. See e.g., U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE 22-35 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
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was to update the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006." Similarly,
there is now a need to update rules and processes where jury trials are
concerned because of the effect of jurors using social media and the
internet.56 Inevitably, compromises and adjustments must be employed
to address the ever growing increase in juror misconduct via social
media and the internet.
II. THE EFFECT OF THE EXPLOSION OF SOCIAL MEDIA
NETWORKS ON JURIES
Prior to the advent of the internet or electronic age, jurors had very
few ways of finding out about the case they were empanelled for.5 In
the past, in order for a juror to get information about a case or parties in
the case, the inquisitive juror would have to act as a sleuth or conduct
his or her own legal research on a matter for clarification.s The
approach used more traditional methods, which took more time and
more effort. Today however, the internet age has changed the landscape
of the deliberation process 59 and the jury's role in the process. 60 At any
point during the trial or after the trial during deliberation, jurors can
rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (explaining that the purpose for the proposed amendments to
Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to provide a
solution for the "problems [associated] with computer-based discovery").
55. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note, at 33, availableat http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/EDiscoverywNotes.pdf ("Lawyers and judges
interpreted the term 'documents' to include electronically stored information because it was
obviously improper to allow a party to evade discovery obligations on the basis that the label
had not kept pace with changes in information technology.").
56. See Rebecca Porter, Texts and Tweets by Jurors, Lawyers Pose Courtroom
Conundrums, TRIAL, Aug. 2009, at 12 (noting how the jury room faces a new threat from the
rise in the use of technology).
57. See, e.g., Gafford v. Warden, 434 F.2d 318, 320 (10th Cir. 1970) (noting that a
witness gave testimony at trial about a gas station and the juror subsequently visited the gas
station to determine whether the gas station was indeed open at the exact time the witness
stated); see also Exparte Potter, 661 So. 2d 260, 261 (Ala. 1994) (discussing a situation where
several jurors visited the scene of the accident to confirm the width of a road where a pedestrian
was killed by a defendant who was intoxicated).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Staples, 445 F.2d 863, 863 (5th Cir. 1971) (dealing with
jurors who had law books in the jury room during deliberations); see generally Nichols v.
Seaboard Coastline Ry. Co., 341 So. 2d 671, 675 (Ala. 1976) (juror research); see also King,
supra note 15.
59. Robert P. MacKenzie III & C. Clayton Bromberg Jr., Jury Misconduct What Happens
Behind Closed Doors, 62 ALA. L. REV. 623, 638 (2011) ("The fastest developing area in the
realm of juror misconduct involves juror use of e-mail, social networking sites such as
Facebook, and micro-blogging sites such as Twitter during trial.").
60. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, MistrialsAre Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html (illustrating how jurors'
Facebook and Twitter posts adversely affected a federal drug trial).
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access information to get details of a case 6 1 by using any of the
available social media sites like Google Maps to determine the distance
between crime scenes.62 Jurors may use the internet to read up on topics
related to the case discussed on various news sites 63 or even Court TV,
which streams live accounts of court proceedings. Thus, the subjective
reporting by the media 64 plays a vital role in what jurors ultimately
consume, and media accounts of active or past trials are the fodder
jurors go looking for.65
In 1997, the world received the first social networking site.66 Nearly
twenty years later, using Facebook, Google, Twitter, Wikipedia, and
other social media sites to conduct an kind of research or to simply
stay "connected" has become routine.6 Information and having access
to information is now universal. 68 Americans are increasingly equipped
with internet-ready phones or other devices that allow quick and easy
access to information. 69 Social media and internet usage has become
totally ingrained in our way of life.70 These same Americans make up
our jury pool. As such, there are a number of scenarios that illustrate
improper jury conduct involving the use of social media. 7' For example,
jurors use the internet to perform investigations of the law or facts
surrounding the case and to conduct research.72 Additionally, jurors use
social media to post or publish information about the case or,
alternatively use social media to contact people connected in some way
to the case. 3 This activity is the driving force behind the move for
61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.
64.

Id.
See generally BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004).

65.

Id.

66. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Networking Sites: Definition, History,
and Scholarship,13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 214 (2007).
67. DOUGLAS L. KEENE & RITA R. HANDRICH, THE DARK SIDE OF THE INTERNET: IN THE
JURY RooM 1 (2009), http://www.keenetrial.com/articles_15_2510325171.pdf.

68. Id.
69. See Amanda McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence
of the Internet and its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 301
(2010) (indicating that individuals turn to "iPhones and Blackberrys to constantly remain up to
date with the latest news").
70. See KEENE & HANDRICH, supra note 67, at 3 ("Social media is a fact of life. If the
current patterns hold true, we will see increasing numbers ofjurors for whom social networking
is so habitual and life-integrated, they will be hard-pressed to see the justification for abstaining
from 'updating their status' during trial.").
71. See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, CRIM. JUST.,
Winter 2011, at 4, 5 ("There seem to be four areas where jurors are using the Internet:
investigating facts, double-checking the law, publicizing their experiences, and contacting third
parties.").
72.

Id.

73.

Id.
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changin or updating our jury process with regard to social media
access.
The standard for what is required to constitute a mistrial based on
juror misconduct where social media is concerned is in a state of flux
because federal and state court judges have broad discretion to give
their own instructions or rules regarding electronic communication by
jurors during trials.7 5 The extent of social media use necessary to
constitute juror misconduct varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. As a
result, the Bench and Bar must evaluate the concerns and fashion
remedies to address the problem. For instance, in Wardlaw v. State,76 a
Maryland case, a criminal defendant was convicted by jury of three
counts of second-degree sexual assault.7 7 The defendant appealed the
conviction because a juror conducted internet research on oppositional
defiant disorder, a condition the defendant had been diagnosed with,
and shared her findings with other members of the jury.78 The trial court
failed to voir dire the remaining jurors to establish whether they could,
after receiving illicit information from the juror, still impartially render
a verdict using only evidence offered at trial. 79 The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded the case for a new trial,
finding that the trial court's failure to voir dire the remaining jurors did
not cure the rebuttable presumption of prejudice against the defendant.so
These actions occurred while the jury was still in deliberations, thereby
violating the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury.8 '
However, in Mathis v. State,82 a Texas case, the defendant was
convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a minor child.83 The
defendant's second issue on appeal was based on a juror's internet
research of several issues involved in the case. 84 The trial court held a
hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial, during which the judge
heard testimony from the jurors and arguments from counsel and
subsequently denied the motion.8 On appeal, the court noted that in
Texas, it is well settled that "outside influence must come from outside

74. Id
75. Porter, supra note 56 ("Both federal and state courts generally set their own rules on
the use of electronic devices in the courthouse . . . .").
76. 971 A.2d 331 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).
77. Id. at 333.
78. Id. at 334.
79. Id. at 335.
80. Id at 339.
81. Id.
82. No. 05-05-01119-CR, 2006 WL 1479879, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 31, 2006).
83. Id.
84. Id. at *7
85. Id. at *8.
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the jury and its deliberations." 86 The court further noted that
"[i]nformation gathered by a juror and shared with the other jurors does
not constitute outside influence, even if shared specifically to influence
the other jurors' votes."87
Both Wardlaw and Mathis deal with juror misconduct via the
internet. However, both courts arrived at different conclusions regarding
the misconduct.8 8 In other words, similar actions of misconduct by
jurors may lead to different outcomes in different courts. It is precisely
this outcome that courts must work hard to prevent. Alarmingly, the
Texas standard for what is considered outside influence by jurors is
totally out of sync with what many other jurisdictions determine to be
outside influence. 89 Other jurisdictions define outside research by a
juror to be outside influence. 90 These cases confirm the need to follow
the e-discovery advocates who were instrumental in the decision to
update the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006 to reflect the
changes the electronic age had on discovery obligations of parties in a
lawsuit.9 '
III. THE LAW REGARDING JURY MISCONDUCT

In 1954, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constitutes
juror misconduct.9 In Remmer v. UnitedStates,9 3 the Court held
[A]ny private communication, contact, or tampering directly or
86. Id. (citing Garza v. State, 630 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. App. 2002)).
87. Id.
88. Compare Wardlaw v. State, 971 A.2d 331, 338 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (holding
that juror's internet research constituted egregious misconduct), with Mathis, 2006 WL
1479879, at *8 (holding that information gathered by a juror and shared with other jurors does
not constitute outside influence, even if shared to influence other jurors).
89.

See Cyr v. State, 308 S.W.3d 19, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that to prove

jury misconduct the movant had to show both that the misconduct occurred and that the
misconduct resulted in harm to the movant); Smith v. State 286 S.W.3d 333, 333 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (holding that an unrestricted right to a hearing regarding jury misconduct "could
lead to 'fishing expeditions"').
90. See, e.g., United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29, 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding
juror misconduct when a juror used the internet to research legal definitions and subsequently
shared her findings with otherjury members).
91. See e.g., U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 23 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/

Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (explaining that amendments to the discovery rules are necessary
because the rules provide inadequate guidance to litigants, judges, and lawyers in determining
discovery rights and obligations in particular cases).
92. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
93. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
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indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending
before the jury is . . . deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not
made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the
instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with
full knowledge of the parties. 94
The impetus of the holding was to give a standard for determining
what type of outside communication is harmful to a party who raises the
issue of juror misconduct. 95 The Remmer holding a ears to
contemplate a more physical or human encounter with a juror.
Further, at that time, there were no electronic devices being used by
jurors since the ruling in Remmer preceded the information or electronic
age. As with most legal issues, when societal changes occur, the law is
slow to catch up, as was the case with addressing the emergence of ediscovery. 97 However, since using electronic devises during trial to gain
or gather information about the trial, judge, lawyers, or parties to the
suit is a form of external communication, such conduct falls into the
realm of what the Court in Remmer sought to prohibit. 98
Subsequently, the Supreme Court changed its position in Smith v.
Phillips9 9 from juror misconduct based on external communication
being presumptively prejudicialloo to requiring there be a clear
representation that the offending conduct by the juror is actually
prejudicial.o'0 The Court's game-changing shift placed the burden
squarely on the defendant to prove, through credible evidence, the
likelihood of juror misconduct.' 02 By shifting the burden to the
defendant to demonstrate prejudicial misconduct by a juror, the Court
recognized that not every misconduct or compromising situation a juror
participates in can be resolved by granting mistrials.' 03 The Court's
conclusion also allows an inference that some information gleaned by
jurors through whatever medium may actually positively impact, not
hurt, the outcome of a trial. Additionally, the court noted that to find
otherwise, that mistrials would resolve misconduct,104 would require
courts to grant mistrials for the flimsiest of reasons, rendering the notion
94. Id. at 229.
95. See id
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note (accommodating changes in
the discovery phase of the trial process as it relates to electronic discovery).
98. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.

99. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
See, e.g., id. at 217; United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1996).
Smith, 455 U.S. at 217 (1982).
Id.
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of due process unattainable because jurors cannot be protected from any
situation that might impinge on how they vote.' 0 5
While courts should not grant mistrials for flimsy reasons, courts
must not and cannot, in light of the possible constitutional violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, refuse to grant mistrials where
juror misconduct involves a serious misuse of social media.106 The
profession needs guidelines about the use, type of information, and what
levels of conduct constitute "a serious misuse of social media." 0 7
IV. WAYS TO AMELIORATE THE INEVITABLE ENCROACHMENT OF
SOCIAL MEDIA ON JURIES

A myriad of solutions have been promulgated by scholars,
practitioners, and judges to combat the use of social media by jurors. In
the recent past, juries have been impassive as they deliberate to reach an
impartial verdict.' 08 Times have changed since then. However, one
thing is certain: for various reasons, jurors want to play a more active
role in the jury process.1 09 The more active role jurors want to play is
wreaking havoc on our modem day judicial system.110
Solutions include adopting additional special language to
supplement existing jury instructions that clearly address the prohibition
on the use of the internet and social media websites by jurors during
trial."' States are already revising jury instructions to include a no
105. Id. at 217 ("[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been
placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be
constitutionally acceptable."); see also 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1302 (2013) ("Not every
instance of misconduct by a juror requires reversal, a mistrial, or a new trial, but each case must
be judged based on the particular facts.").
106. See Clark v. State, No. 0953/08, at 8-9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 3, 2009) (discussing
a situation where a juror in a murder trial conducted online research to find the definitions of
"livor mortis" and "algor mortis" in an attempt to discover the time of death of the victim); see
also Lister v. Cate, No. 07cv822BEN(JMA), 2009 WL 585450, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 2009)
(explaining that the trial court denied the defendant's request for a mistrial because, during
deliberation, a juror used the internet to search possible penalties to assess the defendant based
on the charges in the case).
107. See Clark, No. 0953/08, at 10.
108. See Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1614 (2011).
109. Schwartz, supra note 60 (discussing a Florida federal drug case where the judge
granted a mistrial because of jurors' use of the internet to conduct research where a juror
explained that if there had been no misconduct by jurors, the trial would have lasted much
longer than two days).
110. See, e.g., Tapanes v. State, 43 So. 3d 159, 162 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
t11. See Timothy J. Fallon, Mistrials in 140 Characters or Less? How the Internet and
SocialNetworking are Underminingthe American Jury System and What Can Be Done to Fix It,
38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 935, 937, 954-55 (2010).
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internet use policy and a no tweeting, texting, or Googling policy.112
Most of these jury instructions should be very detailed so that the juror
knows exactly what type of social media and internet use is
prohibited. 113
A. Voir Dire, the Real FirstStep to CurbingSocial Media
Influence on Juries
The purpose of voir dire is to ensure that venire members are
qualified to serve, can be impartial while considering information
delivered during trial, and to determine if venire members can base the
verdict on only the evidence and information garnered during the
112. See CONNECTICUT JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL No. 1.2-10 (2001) (amended 2013),
available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/partl/1.2-10.htm. Rule 284 of the Texas Pattern
Jury Instructions was revised to address the problem of jurors using the internet. Order
Amending the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 281 and 284 and the Jury Instructions Under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 226a, No. 10-9210 (Tex. Mar. 25, 2011), 2011 TX REG TEXT
253483 (NS) (effective Apr. 1, 2011), reprinted in 74 TEX. B.J. 68 (2011). In 2012, the U.S.
Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management issued updated
model jury instructions to combat social media use by jurors. Director'sAnnual Report 2012,
Improving Service to the Public, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/AdministrativeOffice/DirectorAnnualReport/annual-report-201
2/assistance-to-courts-and-their-programs/improving-service-to-the-public.aspx
(last visited
Oct. 26, 2013); U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT.,
PROPOSED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT

RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (2012), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/us
courts/News/2012/j ury-instructions.pdf [hereinafter CACM MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. The
revisions to the model jury instructions were in response to a survey performed by the Federal
Judicial Center. See MEGAN DUNN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JURORS' USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING
TRIALS AND DELIBERATIONS: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE ON COURT

ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 1 (2011) (explaining that the purpose of the survey
was to "assess the frequency with which jurors use social media to communicate during trials
and deliberations, and to identify effective strategies for curbing this behavior").
113. See WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL No. 50 (2009), available at
http://www.postcrescent.com/assets/pdf/U014968718.PDF. The Wisconsin Criminal Jury
Instructions Committee updated its standard jury instructions in 2009 to deal with the issue of
social media and internet use by jurors by stating,
Do not consult dictionaries, computers, websites or other reference materials
for additional information. . . . Any information you obtain outside the

courtroom could be misleading, inaccurate, or incomplete. Relying on this
information is unfair because the parties would not have the opportunity to
refute, explain or correct it....
. . . Do not use a computer, cell phone, or other electronic device with
communication capabilities to share any information about this case. For
example, do not communicate by blog, e-mail, text message, twitter, or in any
other way, on or off the computer.
Id.
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trial.114 The voir dire process is intended to ensure that jurors who are
eventually selected to serve are qualified and free (to the extent
possible) of biases that would impede the juror's ability to be
impartial." 5 To man attorneys, voir dire is the most important aspect
of the trial process.' Because it is the first time attorneys get to meet
future jurors, this is the best time to warn jurors of what type of conduct
is permitted and what conduct is prohibited.'
For attorneys, the process of jury selection starts upon entry to the
courthouse. 1 8 So, attorneys can observe from a distance what jurors are
doing.1 9 An attorney can note which jurors are trained to their smart
phones, iPads, or other electronic gadgets. When the jury is brought into
the courtroom to commence the voir dire process, attorneys should
continue to monitor and observe the social media habits of the people
making up the jury panel.120 A question could be added to the
questionnaire-do you have a social media account? Other questions
could be-how often do you use social media? It has to become routine
operating procedure to question jurors about their social media usage.121
Starting with the questionnaire, which is not routinely used in Texas,
will give the attorneys an idea of the level of social media use by jurors
they may be facing and the opportunity to prevent social media use
problems from the onset.
Part of the onus of controlling social media conduct is on the
attorney. Voir dire must be used to help ensure that the jurors are
continually put on notice of what is acceptable and unacceptable social
media use. Voir dire allows attorneys for the parties to thoroughly
question jurors about their social media habits and to impart to jurors
the importance of not using social media sites, the internet, or any other
external source during deliberations because the sources have not been
vetted 22 by officers of the court. Attorneys and judges can reiterate,
114.
115.
116.
117.

See LIEBERMAN & SALES, supra note 24, at 25.
Id. at 17.
Id
See Denise Zamore, Can Social Media Be Banned from Playing a Role in Our

JudicialSystem?, MINORITY TRIAL LAW. (Minority Trial Lawyer Comm., Chicago, Ill.), Spring

2010, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/practice-areas/minorityjury-social-media.html.

118. See Herald P. Fahringer, In The Valley of the Blind: A Primer on Jury Selection in a
Criminal Case, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 116,127 (1980).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 128.
121. See generally Vesna Jaksic, A New Headachefor Courts: Blogging Jurors, NAT'L
L.J. (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005554098&slretum=20130
825023227 (discussing the relevance and importance of questioning venire members about their
internet lives).
122. Daniel A. Ross, Juror Abuse of the Internet, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.
law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202433573838 (noting that because online information is often
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particularly, what the jury instruction prohibition on social media and
internet usage means because the goal is to get this important
information to potential jurors at the earliest opportunity." Further,
examples of improper use of social media and the internet during the
trial as well as during jury deliberation can also be discussed-stressing
the importance of why jurors must not give in to the urge to use the
internet.124 The admonishment given by a judge to jurors before they go
home for the day, warning them not to do research, use the computer,
Blackberry, iPhone, or to refrain from posting on a blog or on Twitter is
the same admonishment that should be given during voir dire.125 An
admonishment at the outset reinforces the important legal responsibility
that jurors are expected to comply with.
Usually, jurors are not questioned in private, but as members of a
group.126 Because questioning is performed openly, members of the
venire may generally shy away from answering questions truthfully. 127
Since asking questions about social media or internet use is such a welldiscussed topic that is well-received socially, there should be no
problems eliciting truthful answers because Americans readily discuss
social media and internet use.
If attorneys and judges question jurors during voir dire about their
social media or internet usage and how important it is for the juror to
"stay connected," certain responses to these questions can be the basis
for the judge to eliminate jurors for cause sua sponte.' 2 8 Social media
questions, like other questions asked of jurors to ascertain biases, must
be asked to "explore the backgrounds and attitudes of jurors"' 29 toward
social media. Further, since voir dire is the time that lawyers tend to
curry favor with venire members,' 30 it is the perfect time to find out as
much as possible about the potential members and their use of social
media and the internet.
"incorrect or incomplete[,] almost anyone can post a biased or inaccurate opinion online and
pass it off as authoritative").
123. See STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: DISORDER INTHE COURTS 226 (1994).
124. See Ellen Brickman et al., How JurorInternet Use Has Changed the American Jury
Trial, I J. CT. INNOVATION 287, 297 (2008) (noting that jury instructions "could be more
effective if they conveyed two keys issues: first, an understanding that seeking outside
information is indeed tempting and second, an explanation to jurors as to why it is so important
to resist that temptation").
125. David E. Frank, The Use of Technology by Jurorshas Some Judges a-Twitter, MASS.
LAW. WKLY. (Mar. 30, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://masslawyersweekly.com/2009/03/30/use-oftechnology-by-jurors-has-some-judges-atwitter/ (quoting Judge Brassard's instruction to jurors
as he sent them home for the day).
126. See LIEBERMAN & SALES, supra note 24, at 22.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 21.
129. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972).
130. See LIEBERMAN & SALES, supranote 24, at 27.
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Studies have shown that the voir dire has a determining effect on the
trial process.' 3 Sometimes, eliminating jurors may be a source of
disagreement between lawyers.132 However, it is likely that both parties
would prefer eliminating jurors who show signs of excessive social
media usage or internet dependency. An expanded and more aggressive
voir dire should be implemented to combat social media and internet
use by jurors in order to preserve a fair jury trial. 3 3
B. Jury Instructions
Standardized forms of jury instructions, called pattern jury
instructions, originated in California around the 1940s.1 34 Having
instructions standardized assists judges and lawyers by efficiently
explaining legal concepts, definitions, and admonishments while
supporting public interest in uniform application of the law.
Since
their inception in California, many other states have encouraged and
adopted the use of pattern jury instructions.136 Jury instructions help
guide judges and lawyers on what or how to inform jurors about legal
concepts, definitions, and admonishments.' 37 Not only do these jury
131. See Alice M. Padawer-Singer et al., Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential
Safeguard,57 JUDICATURE 386, 390-91 (1974) (illustrating that jurors selected through the voir
dire process were more independent and did not easily give in to the pressure from a group and
were also "more aware of the importance of legal procedures and of admissible evidence").
132. See Fahringer,supra note 118, at 117 (explaining that, during voir dire, counsel for
each party is inclined to select individuals "who . .. can be expected to find in his client's favor"
resulting in a discrepancy between each lawyer's ideal jury).
133. See Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 23-24 (Fla. 1959).
[I]f there is basis for any reasonable doubt as to any juror's possessing that state
of mind which will enable him to render an impartial verdict based solely on
the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial[,] he should be
excused on motion of a party, or by the court on its own motion.
Id This same standard should be applied when judges or lawyers suspect social media or the
internet will pose a problem to a juror's ability to assess and sift through information during
deliberations.
134. See 6 AM. JUR. Trials 923 § 2 (1967).
135. Id. § 3.
136. See State v. Adams, 254 P.3d 515, 524 (Kan. 2011) (noting that although the use of
pattern jury charges is not mandatory, it is encouraged); see also State v. Haire, 697 S.E.2d 396,
400 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing that the "use of pattern jury instructions is encouraged,
but not required"); see also Perez v. State, 29 A.3d 656, 661-62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011)
("[A]s a general matter, use of the pattern jury instructions is favored.").
137. See e.g., TEX. R. Civ. PROC. 284 (2011).
Immediately after jurors are selected for a case the court must instruct them to
turn off their cell phones and other electronic device while they are in the
courtroom or while they are deliberating. The court must also instruct jurors
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instructions explain the legal concepts of the case to jurors, they also
cover what courts have determined to be inappropriate behavior by
jurors.1 38 Many jurisdictions have incorporated instructions prohibiting
the use of electronic communication devices in the courtroom and
during deliberation, and further admonishing jurors not to seek outside
information regarding the case after they leave the courthouse."' The
broad impact that social media and the internet has had upon the justice
system was highlighted when, in 2010, the U.S. Judicial Conference 4 0
sent all federal courts suggested jury instructions addressing electronic
technology usage by jurors.141 The Judicial Conference suggested the
following instructions be used before jurors retire to deliberate:
During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or
provide any information to anyone by any means about this case.
You may not use any electronic device or media, such as the
telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or
computer, the Internet, any Internet service, or any text or instant
messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website such
as Facebook, MySpace, Linkedln, YouTube or Twitter, to
communicate to anyone any information about this case or to
conduct any research about this case until I accept your
verdict.142
Due to the problems the internet age has caused, citizens must be reeducated about the jury's role in our legal system, at the earliest
possible opportunity.
Both judges and lawyers must embrace this
that while they are serving as jurors, they must not pass any information about
the case on the Internet or search for any information outside of the courtroom,
including on the Internet, to try to learn more about the case.
Id.
138.

See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA

SUGGESTED STANDARD

JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL

§

2.06 (2012) ("Do not try to get information relevant to the case on your own. Do not make any
investigation, do any research, visit the scene, or conduct any experiment. Do not conduct any
Internet search about the facts of the case, the participants, or the law regarding these matters.").
139.

See id.; see also NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONSO[CIVIL 1.11 (2013) ("It is

important to remember that you may not use any internet services, such as Google, Facebook,
Twitter or any others to individually or collectively research topics concerning the trial, which
includes the law, information about any of the issues in contention, the parties, the lawyers or
the court.").
140. The U.S. Judicial Conference is responsible for recommending policies for all federal
courts subject to approval by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (effective Jan. 7,
2008).
141. See CACM MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 112.
142. Id.
143.

See ADLER, supra note 123.
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responsibility.
Jury instructions must also be short, to the point, and easy to
comprehend, using appropriate language to put jurors and all other
persons involved in the trial process on notice of the proscribed
conduct. 144 Members of the bench and bar have the responsibility to
ensure that one of our most revered processes, trial by jury, is preserved,
while at the same time modernized, to accommodate the needs of our
changing society. Even though social media has become as much a part
of our society as the "trial by jury," the prohibition on the use of social
media during trials must be strictly enforced to preserve every citizen's
constitutional right.
C. Social Media Based Solutions
To further prevent social media and internet usage by jurors, courts
could have the deliberation room set up so that wireless access is
blocked while jurors are in the deliberation room. At least for the time
that jurors will be deliberating they will not be able to access the
internet or any social media sites. While this solution will not cover
instances of juror misconduct outside the deliberation room, it will at
least address juror misconduct during deliberation.
The public should be informed that no one is exempt from the
misuse of social media.14 5 National campaigns, similar to those
encouraging exercise and healthy diets for children, 146 may be used to
illustrate the importance of having a social media and internet-free
process for trials.
Additionally, citizens who are or will be potential venire members
must receive more detailed information regarding the prohibition on a
juror's use of the internet, 147 and modern technology could be integrated
into that process. For instance, courts could use interactive "apps"14 8 to
144.

See, e.g., HAWAll PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL 2.01 (2005) (rev. 2009),

available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/legal_references/j uryinstruct6.pdf (addressing
juror use of social media stating that "[n]o discussion also means no e-mailing, text messaging,
tweeting, blogging or any other form of communication").
145. See James Podgers, It's Not Easy Being Social, A.B.A. J., May 2013, at 58, available
at http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/aba opinion cautions judges to avoid ethics
pitfalls-ofsocial-media/.
146. An example of a national campaign used to inform the public is Michelle Obama's
"Let's Move!" campaign to combat childhood obesity.
147.

See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 7 (2005),

available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/juryprojectstandards/prin
ciples.authcheckdam.pdf (outlining best practices for orientation, instruction, and education for
jurors prior to and during jury trials as a means of curbing juror misconduct).
148. Short form of the word application, used in electronic devices to access different
programs to accomplish certain takes on mobile devices.
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explain to venire members, in language they can understand, exactly
what "forbidden" use of the internet or social media meansl49 as well as
the ramifications that they may suffer1 50 for violating the judge's
order.' 5 ' The more specific the communication of instruction on
proscribed conduct, the more likely it is that jurors will be less willing
to pursue or perform such conduct. 52
Just as jurors cannot conduct outside research about a case using
social media or the internet, judges must ensure that their social media
use does not raise problems involving disclosure of evidence or any
issues re arding disqualification.' 5 3 The Model Code of Judicial
ConductA requires that judges must always conduct themselves "in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary."15 5
Moreover, even as our judicial system wrestles with social media use
in the courtroom, states are beginning to enact laws forbidding
employers from asking current or prospective employees for their
username and passwords to personal social media accounts. 156 One can
only suspect that privacy concerns, such as the concerns that lead to

149. See, e.g., RULEBOOK, http://www.readyreferenceapps.com/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013)
(offering iTunes applications for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of
Evidence, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Rules of
Evidence, and The Bluebook); TEKK INNOVATIONS,

http://www.tekkinnovations.com/ (last

visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing apps for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCivProc),
Pipeline Regulations, and the Internal Revenue Code).
150. See Assem. B. 141, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (enacted) (implementing
penalties, such as being charged with criminal contempt or serving up to six months jail time,
for California jurors who are found using electronic devices to conduct research on a case or
communicate with people unconnected to the case).
151, See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 166(a) (West, Westlaw through 2011 portion of 20112012 Legis. Sess.) (providing that California jurors who are found using electronic devices to
conduct research on a case or communicate with people unconnected to the case may be charged
with contempt of court).
152. See Tricia R. Deleon & Janelle S. Forteza, Is Your Jury Panel Googling During the
Trial?, 52 ADvoc. 36, 38 (2010) (addressing Texas judges' suggestions that jurors who use the
internet do not think they are violating their jury instructions by such use and proposing, as a
solution to address the issue, that judges give more specific jury instructions).
153. Id.
154.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 1 (2010).

155. Id.
156. See, e.g., H.B. 1046, 69th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (enacted)
(prohibiting an employer from suggesting, requesting, requiring, or causing an employee or
applicant for employment to disclose a username, password, or other means for accessing a
personal account or service through an electronic communications device); S.B. 5211, 63d Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013) (enacted) (establishing rules to prevent employers from coercing
employees or applicants into revealing private information via social media or electronic
devices).
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enacting such laws in Colorado and Washington,1 5 7 will be the same
concerns raised by prospective jurors who will be asked about their
social media and internet habits. 1 However, courts are routinely
granting requests by parties to access social media accounts1 59 to prove
the existence or non-existence of behavior that contradicts claims of
injury.160 As a result, social media use could evolve from being a well
talked about subject, to one of the utmost privacy.
CONCLUSION

Jurors and the jury process have evolved since the time of the first
juries in the early centuries.161 Earlier jurors were expected to be
selected from the place the crime was perpetrated. 162 Inherent in that
expectation was the knowledge that there could be prejudice because
parties knew the perpetrator and the victim.163 Jurors of the colonial
times, like judges, layed active roles in the trial process to ultimately
mete out justice. Jurors had the power to measure and balance the
information gleaned from the trial to decide punishment; and the ability
to ensure that whatever verdict was rendered was on par with what they
felt was just and fair.' 65 This meant that often, the law became of
157. See id
158. See Michael R. Glover, The Right to Privacy ofProspectiveJurorsDuring Voir Dire,
70 CAL. L. REv. 708, 711 (1982) ("[P]rospective jurors should have a constitutional right to
privacy protecting them from disclosure of personal information during voir dire.").
159. See, e.g., Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, at 1 (Pa. C.P. Franklin
Cnty. Nov. 8, 2011). In Largent, a couple that was involved in a motorcycle accident claimed
injuries from the accident. Id. at 2. The defendant moved to compel disclosure of the Facebook
username and password of the plaintiff-wife because the wife had posted photographs of herself
going to the gym. Id. at 6. The court granted the request, holding that "no general privacy
privilege protects [the plaintiff-wife]'s Facebook material from discovery," Id. at 9. See also
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285, at 2, 8 (Pa.
C.P. Jefferson Cnty. Sept. 9, 2010) (granting the defendant access to the plaintiff's social
networking passwords after the plaintiff argued that such access violated his "social network site
privilege").
160. Largent, 2011 WL 5632688, at 6, 9.
161. See generally Engel, supra note 30 (examining the development of vicinage in jury
selection from its application in early English courts to its current role in the modem American
legal system).
162. Id.
163. See Id.
164.

WILLIAM E. NELSON,

AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF

LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETrS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 3 (1975).

165. See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1062-63 (1994) (noting that it was
common practice in the eighteenth century for jurors to influence or induce verdicts to obtain
the desired outcome of the group).
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secondary importance to the will of the jurors.166 The electronic age has
birthed the internet and social media. These mediums are allowin
jurors to be more informed about all parties involved in the litigation.
The jury process is not perfect and has many weaknesses.1 68 Even in the
internet age, the most noted weaknesses are still the "lack of efficiency
and expertise."l 69 Whether we like it or not, we are returning to the
times of juries past. In other words, self-informing jurieso7 0 are
resurfacing as a result of social media.17 1 In the past, jurors were
allowed to use personal knowledge to reach verdicts.1 72 Today juries
are, without permission, using social media and the internet to answer
the same types of questions that their "predecessor juries" sought to
answer.
Therefore, we must find a way to adapt and change, like other areas
have been forced to do in light of the internet age. 1 13 Members of the
bench and bar must, as much as possible, try to predict any scenario that
could influence jurors' verdicts. Anticipating that jurors will be using
some form of social media1 74 will allow attorneys and judges to be
proactive in finding workable solutions to the problem.
Judges must allow juries to inquire about things that are confusing or
not clear if they are truly going to be fair and impartial.' Knowledge
with judicial guidelines may infuse twenty-first century jurors with the
166. Id (discussing how jurors influenced verdicts so as to protect the accused from the
ultimate punishment of the death penalty).
167. See Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 443-44 (S.D. 2009) (upholding the trial
court's order for a new trial because a juror, after the juror received a jury summons but before
he was selected to serve on the jury, used the internet to research the defendant company and
told five jurors, during deliberations, about his research and that the defendant company had no
other prior lawsuits).
168. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at xiii.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing Tools For
Rational Jury Decisionmaking,85 Nw. U. L. REv. 221, 225 (1990) ("There is no question in my
mind that providing jurors with additional tools such as preliminary instruction, notetaking, and
jury questioning enhances the rational aspects of the jury's fact-finding role.").
171. See Dr. Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, Online and Wired for Justice: Why
Jurors Turn to the Internet, JuRY EXPERT, Nov. 2009, at 14, passim, available at
http//www.thejuryexpert.comL/wp-content/uploads/KeeneTJENov2009.pdf
172. See Engel, supra note 30, at 1674.
173. Educators have been forced to integrate technology into the classroom in light of the
fact that new generations use computers and learn interactively by multitasking, marking a
drastic change from earlier generations.
174. Grow, supra note 14 ("The explosion of blogging, tweeting and other online
diversions has reached into U.S. jury boxes, raising serious questions about juror impartiality
and the ability ofjudges to control courtrooms.").
175. See, e.g., Mich. Ct. R. 2.513(H)-(I) (2011) (expanding the activities of jurors to allow
them to ask questions of witnesses through the judge and generate notes during trial for use
during deliberations).
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requisite tools to perform their charges more effectively and efficiently.
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